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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Western agrees with Appellants' characterization of the case with the following 
exceptions: 
1. The snow removal agreement between the Wells Fargo and Western 
was by no means "comprehensive and exclusive;" 
2. Western did not undertake or assume Wells Fargo's duties with 
respect to the management of black ice in the Hayden parking lot; 
and, 
3. The nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries - an issue that is not 
properly before this Court -- is sharply disputed, 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Appellants' statement of the proceedings is accurate and complete. Although 
Western advanced alternative legal theories in its summary judgment motion, the only 
issue before this Court is whether Western owed a duty to Mrs. Gagnon. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Western had an unwritten agreement with Wells Fargo in December 2007 to 
remove new snow accumulations from the parking lot and sidewalks of the Hayden 
bank branch, and to apply ice melt to only the sidewalks and the area around the ATM 
machine. R. p.59 ,-r4. That agreement included the same terms as set forth in a 2004 
written contract that had expired in 2006. R p.117. Western never contracted or 
otherwise agreed to assume responsibility for the safety of persons using the Hayden 
branch parking lot. R. p.61 ~ 9 
The agreement with Wells Fargo for the 2007-08 winter season did not authorize 
Western to apply any de-icer or traction material to the parking lot of the Hayden 
branch. During that time, Wells Fargo never requested that Western provide ice melt or 
sanding services at any Wells Fargo parking lots, including the Hayden branch lot. Nor 
did Western undertake to provide those services in 2007-2008. R p.59 ~ 5. Instead, 
the Wells Fargo Hayden branch maintained a supply of de-icer for its employees to use 
on the premises. R. p. 61 ~ 9; R. p. 70. 
In conformance with its agreement, Western removed fresh accumulations of 
snow from the Hayden branch parking lot on December 2 and 3, 2007. R. pp.60 and 
63. No new snow fell in the Hayden, Idaho area between December 3 and December 
5, 2007. R. pp. 73-82 On December 5, 2007, plaintiff fell on "black ice" in the Hayden 
branch parking lot as she was exiting her car. R. p. 69. Plaintiff does not claim that 
there was fresh snow in the parking lot at the time she fell. R. p. 69. Wells Fargo 
accepted the work without complaint and paid Western in full for its services in 
December 2007. R. pp. 60-61 ~ 8. 
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II. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did Western owe a duty to plaintiff where Western did not assume responsibility 
for black ice in the Wells Fargo parking lot and did nothing to create or exacerbate the 
condition that aliegedly caused plaintiff's injury? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellants' statement of the standard of review is a correct recitation of the law 
as far as it goes. Western would supplement appellants' statement with the following 
points. First, when the party moving for summary judgment will not have the burden of 
production or proof at trial, the "no genuine issue of material fact" requirement may be 
met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party 
will be required to prove at trial. Ounnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 
478 (Ct.App.1994). 
Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative 
showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving 
party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Id. at n. 1, 
882 P.2d at 478 n. 1. Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the 
burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, 
discovery responses, or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. 
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Oist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994). 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c), which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c), has stated: 
3 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be 
"no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of 
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to 
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with 
respect to which she has the burden of proof. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted in Idaho. Ounnick, 
126 Idaho 308, 312, 882 P.2d 475, 479 (1994). 
Finally, it is not the intent of F.R.C.P. 56 "to preserve purely speculative issues of 
fact for trial." Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 663 F.2d 120, 128 (O.C.Cir.1980). 
Therefore, a party opposing summary judgment cannot demand a trial simply because 
of the "speculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear at that time." 10B 
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Wright Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure §2739 at 388-89 (3d ed.1998). It is well settled that a mere 
scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand 




A. Summary judgment was appropriate where it is undisputed that Western 
did not assume a duty to manage black ice in the Wells Fargo parking lot, and 
that Western diligently fulfilled its limited contractual obligation to remove 
new accumulations of snow from the parking lot. 
A limited contractual undertaking to provide snow removal services does not 
render the contractor liable in tort for personal injuries sustained by third party invitees 
using the property. See Wheaton v. East End Commons Associates, LLC, 854 N.Y.S.2d 
528 (2008). A snow removal contractor becomes liable only where the contractor 
negligently creates or exacerbates a dangerous condition, where the invitee relies on 
the contractor's continued performance, or where the snowplowing contract is so 
comprehensive and exclusive that it entirely displaces the property owner's duty to 
maintain the premises safely. Anderson v. Jefferson-Utica Group, Inc., 809 N.Y.S.2d 
693 (2006). 
Although no reported Idaho decisions address a snow removal contractor's 
liability to a third party, the aforementioned rule has been recognized and followed in 
several other snow belt jurisdictions. For example, in Eichler v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 167 
III. App. 3d 685, 521 N.E.2d 1196 (1988), where an invitee slipped and fell in a movie 
theater's icy parking lot, the court held that a snow plowing company, which contracted 
with the owner of the parking lot to perform snow plowing and snow removal but did not 
have a contractual duty to remove ice, could not be held liable to the invitee. According 
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to the court, even if the removal of snow led to the later accumulation of ice on the 
surface, that scenario would not itself constitute negligence. 
In Wells v. Great At/antic & Pacific Tea Co., 171 III. App. 3d 1012, 525 N.E.2d 
1127 (1988), in which a plaintiff who slipped and fell on a patch of ice in the parking lot 
of a store brought a suit against the contractor who had been hired to remove snow 
from the parking lot, the court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
contractor, ruling that the plaintiff could not rely on the snow removal contract between 
the store and the contractor to impose liability on the contractor. The court further held 
that absent evidence of negligent snow plowing operations by the contractor, there was 
no showing of a duty owed to plaintiff. 
Similarly, in Hellmann v. Droege's Super Market, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1997), in which a grocery store customer was injured when she slipped and fell on 
ice in a store's parking lot and brought a negligence action against the store and a snow 
removal service that the store had contracted, the court held that the trial judge did not 
err in directing a verdict in favor of the contractor. After noting that the contractor had 
not contracted to insure the safety of the parking lot, the court further held that 1) the 
service's agreement with the store was to plow the parking lot after each winter storm, 
2) the service did plow on the day of the last snow storm, and 3) the service had neither 
a contractual duty nor a legal right to plow the lot on the day plaintiff fell. 
The result was the same in Autrino v. Hausrath's Landscape Maintenance, Inc., 
231 A.D.2d 943, 647 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1996), in which an employee who slipped and fell 
on ice in his employer's parking lot sued the contractor that provided snow removal 
services for the employer. The court held that the trial judge properly granted the 
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contractor's motion for summary judgment, since the contractor did not contractually 
assume the employer's duty for ice removal. 
In La Due v. G &A Group Inc., 241 A.D.2d 791, 660 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1997), where 
a shopping center customer fell on an accumulation of ice and snow in a parking lot, the 
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to a company that contracted with the 
operator of the shopping center to provide snow removal services. Holding that the 
company did not assume a duty to the plaintiff by virtue of its contract with the operator, 
the court noted that the company's snow removal obligation was not an exclusive 
property maintenance obligation, as was demonstrated by the shopping center 
operator's retained control over when the contractor sanded and salted the parking lot. 
Significantly, plaintiffs have cited several other cases in their opening appellate 
brief that also lend support to Western's position. For example, in Espinal v. Melville 
Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 773 N.E.2d 485 (2002), which is discussed at 
length by the Gangons, the court dismissed the plaintiff's case on summary judgment, 
holding that the defendant snow removal contractor did not enter into a "comprehensive 
and exclusive" agreement that entirely displaced the property owner's duty to safely 
maintain the premises. The court pointed to terms in the contract that limited the 
snowplowing activity and authorized ice melt only if requested by the property owner. 
The Espinal court also found no evidence to support plaintiff's argument that the 
contractor had exacerbated the ice hazard by plowing the snow. Other New York snow 
removal cases cited by the plaintiffs are also in accord with the Espinal holding. See 
Anderson v Jefferson-Utica Group Inc., 226 A.D.3d 760, 809 N. Y.S.2d 693 (2006); 
Torella v. Benderson Dvlpt. Co., 307 A.D.2d 727, 763 N. Y.S.2d 876 (2003); Kozak v. 
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Broadway Joe's, 296 AD.2d 683, 745 N. Y.S.2d 139 (2002); Engel v. Eichler, 290 
AD.2d 477, 736 N.Y.S.2d 676 (2002); Borden v. Wilmorite, Inc., 271 AD.2d 864, 706 
N. Y.S.2d 230 (2000). 
Idaho case law is consistent with the above-cited decisions in holding that a 
person has no affirmative duty to protect others from a hazard unless that person 
created the hazard or voluntarily assumed a duty to act. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi 
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 987 P.2d 300 (1999). Where a person assumes such a duty, 
"the duty that arises is limited to the duty actually assumed." Martin v. Twin Falls 
School Dist. No. 411, 138 Idaho 146,150,59 P.3d 317, 321 (2002). 
In the instant case, Western's only obligation to maintain the parking lot in 
December 2007 arose from its agreement with Wells Fargo. That agreement clearly did 
not create a "comprehensive and exclusive" property maintenance obligation at the time 
of plaintiff's accident, as evidenced by the fact that during the 2007-2008 snow season, 
Wells Fargo only authorized Western to remove new snow accumulations from the 
parking lot and never requested an application of de-icer or traction material in the lot. 
Wells Fargo also affirmatively retained control over winter maintenance of the premises 
by making ice melt available for its employees to use. Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, 
neither the number of employee and subcontractors utilized by Western, nor the number 
of customers it provided services to, alters the scope of its contractual undertaking at 
the Hayden bank branch. 
In his memorandum decision, the trial judge made the following finding with 
regard to the scope of Western's responsibility for the Hayden branch parking lot: 
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The plain language of the 2004 Agreement shows that the Defendant did 
not undertake an absolute duty to remove snow and distribute ice melt in 
the Wells Fargo Bank parking lot on days where less than two (2) inches 
to snow falls .... As a result, there is no genuine issue of material fact that 
the Defendant did not owe the Plaintiff a duty, and the Defendant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
R. p. 220. 
Furthermore, the evidence is uncontroverted that 1) Western had fulfilled its 
limited obligation to remove snow from the parking lot on December 2 and 3, 2007, 2) 
no additional snow fell in the interim, and 3) the accident was the result of "black ice" 
rather than an accumulation of snow. There is no evidence that Western caused or 
contributed to the black ice condition. Because Western did not contractually assume 
an obligation to deal with ice in the parking lot or otherwise insure the safety of persons 
using the parking lot, no duty was owed to plaintiff under the uncontroverted facts of this 
case. 
B. Appellants have failed to create a factual issue regarding the scope of 
Western's contractual obligations 
In response to Western's summary judgment motion, plaintiffs submitted a bare 
bones affidavit from Heather Gable that failed to address, let alone dispute, any of the 
factual assertions set forth by Jan Vaterlaus in his August 15, 2011 affidavit. 
Significantly, nowhere in her affidavit does Gable state that Western was authorized to 
apply ice melt or abrasive material to the parking lot of the Hayden branch during the 
2007-2008 snow season. In fact, Gable was not even the person who supervised 
Western's services at the Hayden branch in 2006-2007. R. pp. 187-188,-r 2. 
9 
Nor does the expired agreement attached to the Gable affidavit offer any support 
for plaintiffs' position that Western assumed a contractual obligation to apply ice melt to 
the parking lot. Paragraph 2 of Appendix B spells out the following relevant 
performance specifications for Western's work: 
b. CONTRACTOR will furnish all necessary labor, equipment, materials 
and supplies (with the exception of ice melt) needed to perform the 
conditions and specifications of Snow Removal. 
c. CONTRACTOR will clear all parking areas and/or sidewalks when two 
(2) inches of snow has accumulated. The initial clearing will occur prior to 
8:00am of each snow day. 
d. Ice melt is to be used when necessary. In most cases, ice melt will be 
furnished by BANK. If not furnished, ice melt is to be billed as an extra 
item. Calcium chloride ice melt only is to be used - no salt is to be used. 
f. Access surrounding the BANK ATMs should be kept reasonably clear of 
snow and ice 7 days per week, 24 hours a day. 
R. p.135. 
These specifications do not call for ice melt to be applied to the parking areas. 
Only the ATM is specifically identified as an area to be kept clear of ice. Nothing in the 
specifications is inconsistent with the procedures in place 2007-2008 between the 
Bank and Western as described in the first Vaterlaus affidavit. R. p.188 11 3. In their 
opening brief, plaintiffs cite the following language in paragraph 4 of Appendix B: 
4. CONTRACTOR shall communicate effectively with subcontractors and 
other employees to ensure that all parking lots, sidewalks and other areas 




This contract provision, which deals with timely and effective communication between 
Western and its subcontractors, is not germane because it does not specify which 
areas are to be cleared of ice. 
Although plaintiffs have attempted to provide their own interpretation of the 
contract, the agreement when read in its entirety is unambiguous with respect to what 
services Western was authorized to provide in the parking lot. Even if an ambiguity 
was found to exist, the result would be the same. The primary consideration in 
interpreting an ambiguous term of a contract is the intentions of the parties, which 
intentions are to be gleaned from the evidence. Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 
Idaho 130, 540 P.2d 792 (1975); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 415 
P.2d 48 (1966). 
In the instant case, the only evidence available to interpret an ambiguity comes 
from Jan Vaterlaus, since the Heather Gable affidavit is devoid of any elucidation as to 
where ice melt was to be used. According to Mr. Vaterlaus, the written agreement did 
not authorize Western to apply ice melt to the parking lot. Therefore, the Gable 
declaration cannot create a factual dispute to avoid summary judgment by merely 
stating that the parties continued to operate on the terms previously agreed to in the 
expired written agreement, without first explaining how the written agreement was 
interpreted by the parties. 
C. Plaintiff's reliance on the Baccus and Palka decision is misplaced. 
Although the factual scenarios in Baccus, decided by this Court, and Palka, a 
New York appellate court decision, are analogous the case at bar, the results in those 
two cases are readily distinguishable from the instant case. In Palka, the defendant 
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assumed overall management responsibilities for a hospital's maintenance department, 
including training of hospital employees. A nurse in the hospital was injured when a 
fan fell from its stand. The threshold question, which the appellate court decided in 
favor of the plaintiff, was whether the defendant had contractually agreed to supervise 
a preventative maintenance program that included fan inspections. Only after finding 
that the defendant had assumed this contractual obligation did the court go on to 
determine whether defendant's failure to perform its contractual duty would permit a 
third party to sue in tort for injuries resulting from the breach. 
Unlike Palka, the snow removal agreement did not entirely displace Wells 
Fargo's duties as a landowner to provide reasonably safe conditions for its invitees. 
This is borne out by the fact that Wells Fargo maintained a supply of ice melt on the 
premises for its own use. Moreover, the bank placed express limits on the services 
that Western could provide, such as requiring a 2" snow accumulation before services 
were commenced, specifying the type of ice melt to be used, and limiting its application 
to sidewalks and the ATM. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for finding 
that Western assumed the land owner's duty to its invitees with respect to ice in the 
parking lot. 
In Baccus, this Court held that a building maintenance contractor could face 
premises liability exposure to an injured invitee under two circumscribed situations: a 
special relationship between plaintiff and defendant, or a voluntary undertaking in 
which the contractor assumes the duty owed by the property owner to the plaintiff. 
Under the latter scenario, which presents the only potential basis for Western to have 
liability in the instant case, the Court held that the following facts must be established: 
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A duty arises in the negligence context when one previously has undertaken to 
perform a primarily safety-related service; others are relying on the continued 
performance of the service; and it is reasonably foreseeable that legally-
recognized harm could result from failure to perform the undertaking. 
145 Idaho at 351; 179 P.3d at 314. The Baccus court found that the contractor had 
assumed the duty to replace a mat at a building entrance on a weekly basis. Because 
there was evidence suggesting that the contractor failed to replace the mat on one 
occasion and thereby created a hazardous condition, the court held that summary 
judgment was inappropriate. In the instant case, however, there is not a scintilla of 
evidence to support a finding that Western undertook an obligation to prevent ice from 
forming in the Wells Fargo parking lot. Since Western had not previously applied ice-
melt to the parking lot, plaintiff cannot claim to have relied on continued performance, as 
was the situation in Baccus. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to create a triable issue of fact after 
Western established an absence of evidence that it had assumed responsibility for 
managing black ice conditions in the parking lot. The repeated use of the phrase 
"comprehensive and exclusive" in appellants' brief does not change the fact that 
Western's contractual obligation was limited to removal of new accumulations of snow 
in the lot. As a result, the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' action based on an 
absence of a legal duty, and Western requests that this Court affirm that ruling. 
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Respectfully submitted this 18th day of September, 2012. 
Law Offices of Raymond W. Schutts 
Edward G. Johnson ( / 
Attorney for Responder1t Western Building Maintenance, Inc. 
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Starr Kelso 
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